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Foreword

Exclusionary Rules: An Introduction
By PAUL N. HALVONIK*
The law abounds in exclusionary rules. The law of evidence deals
with little else. Is it hearsay? Exclude it. Is the witness incompetent?
We shall not hear from him. Is the proffered evidence untimely and
inconsistent with a discovery order? Then it cannot come in. Spectral
evidence is no longer fashionable, even in Salem, although a witch cannot be nailed without it. Torture brings some of the best evidence, but
there is no civilized court that will listen to it.
There are times when the rules of evidence promote the search for
truth and times when they hinder it, but a legal system cannot function
without them. Their value transcends the investigation of any particular fact or case; that, after all, is what any system of law is about. Ad
hoc resolution of human disputes is a method of procedure, but we
would not call it a legal procedure. Although there are situations in
which a severing of procedural restraints might serve the interests of
truth, experience suggests that the gain would be transitory and ultimately destructive. Truth and the methods used to find it are not distinct and separable, as Madison knew before Heisenberg.
This issue of the HastingsLaw Journaldevotes two Articles to the
"exclusionary rule." By that the authors mean exclusionary rules of
constitutional dimension. No garden-variety exclusionary rules are
discussed, but both Articles acknowledge that the Constitution has
more than one exclusionary rule. There is the express exclusionary rule
of the fifth amendment----"No person. . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself,"-as well as the exclusionary consequences that result from the double jeopardy clause.' Exclusionary rules also attend and vindicate the first, 2 fourth, 3 sixth, 4 and
A.B., 1960; LL.B., 1963, University of California, Berkeley.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. See Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
3. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
*
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fourteenth 5 amendments.
Professor Goodpaster concentrates on the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule. Although unenthusiastic about this rule, Professor
Goodpaster insists that it cannot be abandoned absent an alternative
remedy for vindication of the right to privacy guaranteed by the fourth
amendment. Professor Goodpaster proposes an administrative scheme
to protect fourth amendment privacy rights, but concedes that the
adoption of such a mechanism is remote. As his plan includes the payment of money damages and attorney's fees to criminals, his pessimism
is amply justified.
Confirmation for his pessimism is immediately forthcoming from
the authors of the second Article, Van de Kamp and Gerry. They deride administrative mechanisms and propose instead a New Centralism. The problem, as they see it, is that California has its own
constitution, which is enforced, as is any constitution, by rules of evidence. Their answer, disarming in its simplicity, is to repeal the California Constitution. They propose an amendment that would make the
California Constitution precatory, with no influence on the law of evidence; constitutional rules would have one source and one source only,
the United States Supreme Court. 6
A state constitution that serves no purpose other than to incorporate by reference the decisions of the United States Supreme Court
seems a waste of lumber. What are the justifications for such a startling
proposal? Van de Kamp and Gerry give us three.
1) It is the natural order of things. State constitutional rules are a
"new" development. In truth, state constitutions, and their interpretation, antedate the federal constitution. As John Marshall reminded us
in Barron v. Baltimore,7 "Each state established a constitution for itself,
and in that constitution, provided such limitations and restrictions on
the powers of its particular government, as its judgment dictated." 8
2) State constitutions confuse things. Van de Kamp and Gerry
complain that the California exclusionary rule is considerably broader
than the federal rule. It is, however, constitutionally forbidden to have
exclusionary rules that are narrower than those announced by the
4. See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
5. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).

6. More precisely, the California Constitution would be repealed in criminal proceedings, but would remain in full force elsewhere, a situation that ought to produce a great deal
of confusion.
7. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
8. Id. at 247.
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United States Supreme Court. Thus, Van de Kamp and Gerry have
conveyed less information than might appear. An independent state
constitution is necessarily broader than the federal constitution; otherwise it is redundant or unconstitutional.
3) Van de Kamp and Gerry prefer the United States Supreme
Court to the California Supreme Court. This preference is the primary
thrust of their Article, but, aside from the question whether the contrast
between the members of particular courts at particular times is a sound
reason for altering our organic law, is there any reason to share their
preference? They do not approve of People v. Triggs9 and Bielicki v.
Superior Court,1" in which the California Supreme Court held that
when I enter a restroom stall and close the door I will be free from the
concern that the police are spying through peepholes. The protection
of my privacy in these moments, however, does not extend to California's federal enclaves. 1 I may be shy and fastidious, but I prefer the
California rule.
Van de Kamp and Gerry are critical of Burrows v. Superior
Court12 because the court held that, without the benefit of legal process
or the consent of a bank customer, the police cannot lawfully obtain
copies of the customer's bank statement from the bank. It is unclear,
however, why the government should have access to our bank records
without a warrant. The records are not going to disappear. If the government has good cause for invading our financial privacy, it will have
no problem finding a magistrate who will recognize it.
Van de Kamp and Gerry are repelled by People v. Brisendine13
because it does not permit a full search of a person arrested for a traffic
infraction. They prefer the federal rule, adding that they do not think
it will mean that we must submit to strip searches whenever we make a
faulty lane change. A number of police departments, less permissive
than the authors, have reached the opposite conclusion, and there
seems to be no reason for supposing that they are wrong. But as long
as there is a California Constitution and a Brisendine decision, I need
not worry about it.
The co-authors reserve their harshest criticism for one of Justice
Traynor's most venerated opinions, People v. Martin.'4 In Martin, the
court held that when the police have acted unlawfully, the criminally
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

8 Cal. 3d 884, 506 P.2d 232, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1973).
57 Cal. 2d 602, 371 P.2d 288, 21 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1962).
Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965).
13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974).
13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975).
45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955).
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accused need show no invasion of his or her individual property interests to invoke the exclusionary rule, because "such a limitation virtually invites law enforcement officers to violate the rights of third parties
and to trade the escape of a criminal whose rights are violated for the
conviction of others by the use of the evidence illegally obtained
against them." 15 In other words, if the government is interested in
stealing the books of Payner and finds that Wolstencroft has them in
his possession, the rule that Van de Kamp and Gerry prefer encourages
the government to burglarize Wolstencroft and use the evidence against
Payner. The United States Supreme Court approved such a scheme in
United States v. Payner.16 Thus, when the "plumbers" burglarize the
office of Dr. Fielding and steal the files of Daniel Ellsberg, the Constitution of the United States permits the purloined evidence to be used
against Daniel Ellsberg. Ellsberg has no standing to complain of the
burglary. I prefer Justice Traynor's rule.
Whether one court is wiser than another is not the significant issue.
The significant issue is our conception of the Bill of Rights and the
spirit in which we approach it. The liberties it guarantees are not a
nagging and impractical set of handcuffs; they are the substance and
soul of the nation. They should not be interpreted grudgingly. As the
Supreme Court stated when first passing upon the fourth amendment
in Boyd v. United States,17 we should adhere "to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed" because a "close and literal construction deprives
them of half their efficacy and leads to gradual depreciation of the
right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance."1 8
Neither of the following Articles proceeds in this spirit. Professor
Goodpaster, a literalist, suggests that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule is not a constitutional necessity because, unlike the fifth
amendment, the fourth amendment contains no express exclusionary
language. This is true also of the sixth amendment. Would Professor
Goodpaster propose an administrative alternative to the sixth amendment's exclusionary rule, permitting the government to use information
against an accused that was obtained by eavesdropping on conversations between an attorney and his or her client? If not, then he should
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 760, 290 P.2d at 857.
447 U.S. 727 (1980).
116 US.616 (1886).
Id. at 635. In his famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928),

Justice Brandeis called Boyd "a case that will be remembered as long as civil liberty lives in
the United States." ld. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Boyd was effectively overruled by
the Burger Court in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).

May 1982]

EXCLUSIONARY RULES

explain his reasoning, because there is a much stronger case for the
fourth amendment's exclusionary rule than there is for the sixth's. The
fourth and fifth amendments are intimately related, as the Supreme
Court noted in Boyd v. UnitedStates.
They throw great light on each other. For the "unreasonable
searches and seizures" condemned in the Fourth Amendment are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against himself, which in criminal cases is condemned in the
Fifth Amendment; and compelling a man "in a criminal case to be a
witness against himself," which is condemned in the Fifth Amendment, throws light on the question as to what is an "unreasonable
search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
And we have been unable to perceive that the seizure of a man's
private books and papers to be used in evidence against him is substantiay different from compelling him to be a witness against
himself. 9

The fourth amendment, like the fifth, inhibits the way in which
government may go about collecting evidence. The evil that inspired it,
the hated writs of assistance by which the English enforced their revenue laws, was a principal cause of the American Revolution. The
Revolution was not about taxes; it was about procedure. The questions
raised by the colonists were: 1) How is the body which imposes taxes to
be selected? and 2) How will those laws be enforced? John Adams, no
misty-eyed liberal, said of James Otis's 1761 argument against the writs
of assistance that "then and there was the first scene of the first Act of
Opposition to the arbitrary Claims of Great Britain. Then and there
20
the child Independence was born."
Writs of assistance gave revenue officers the power to search without cause. 2 ' The fourth amendment's response is to require that
searches be supported by cause and that they be specific, not general.
The fourth amendment prohibits the government from invading our
19. 116 U.S. at 633. The Court did not have a fourth amendment case until 1886, and
was to have no more until this century, because Congress refused to give the executive
branch any but the most limited of search powers before the First World War. The legislative history is collected by Justice Frankfurter in three dissenting opinions. See United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 68 (1950); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 155
(1947); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 594 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). State
governments were not limited by the fourth amendment until 1949, when the Supreme
Court held that the fourteenth amendment, by incorporating the fourth, prohibits the states
as well as the federal government from unreasonably violating an individual's privacy.
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). The Wo/f opinion had no effect, however, for the
Court did not include the exclusionary rule as part of the fourth amendment. Woff is our
only experience of a fourth amendment without an exclusionary rule, and it was disastrous.
The mistake was corrected in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
20. 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 107 (Wroth & Zobel ed. 1965).
21. See generally M. SMrrH, THE WRrrs OF ASSISTANCE CASE (1978).
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privacy without good reason, because liberty needs breathing room.
The government might discover more crime by keeping us all under
surveillance, but the fourth amendment strikes the balance against general surveillance. When the government, without cause, enters our
homes and seizes our books and papers, it is no more entitled than
anyone else to convert our papers to its use.
Professor Goodpaster, however, asks whether prohibiting the government from using evidence that it has stolen is an effective way of
enforcing the fourth amendment, questioning whether the exclusionary
rule in fact deters unlawful police conduct. The concept of deterrence,
however, is not involved here. If someone were to tell you that he
never parks his Mercedes on the street with the window open, the key
in the ignition, and his wallet lying on the dashboard, adding that he
calls these precautions "deterrence," would you not say that he was
using the word "deterrence" in a peculiar manner, and that there is a
significant distinction between removing incentives for lawlessness and
deterring lawlessness? If the purpose of the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule is to remove the incentive for lawlessness rather than to
deter it, then the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule is manifest. In
1954, the year before the California Supreme Court adopted a searchand-seizure exclusionary rule,2 2 there were but seventeen search warrants issued in the entire County of Los Angeles.2 3 Now there are
thousands. The significance of that fact can only be appreciated when
we understand the purpose of the warrant requirement. No one expressed it better than Justice Jackson:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped
by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support
of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence.
Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by
a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the
officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime. Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce
the Amendment to a nullity and leave
the people's homes secure only
24
in the discretion of police officers.
Both Articles discuss the wisdom of a "good faith" escape from the
fourth amendment's strictures. Professor Goodpaster does not care for
it, but Van de Kamp and Gerry think it a good idea. Under a good
22. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
23. Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence Obtainedby Illegal Searches-A Comment on People
Y. Cahan, 43 CALIF. L. REV. 563, 570 (1955).
24. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
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faith exception, a search otherwise illegal would be validated if the police officer testified that he or she did not know he or she was violating
the law. If ignorance of the law is to become an excuse, then the last
place to start should be with law enforcement agencies. Law enforcers
should be better acquainted with the law than the citizenry at large,
and it seems strange to offer them an incentive for ignorance. Moreover, it is clear that a good faith exception would make a sham of the
fourth amendment.
If ignorance becomes an excuse for the government's violations of
laws, then the government will not be held to the same standards as its
citizens. Since a reluctantKing John conceded the point in 1215, no
government has been comfortable with the notion that it, as well as the
governed, must conform to the law. Oliver Cromwell's response is typical. When the judges, "with all humility, mentioned the law and
Magna Carta, Cromwell told them, with terms of contempt and derishould not control his actions; which he
sion, their magna f_
' 2' 5
knew were for the safety of the Commonwealth.
The fourth amendment is the first written constitutional guarantee
of the right of privacy, but it is no longer the only one. Other nations
have copied its sentiment. Article 55 of the fundamental law of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics provides: "Citizens of the U.S.S.R.
are guaranteed inviolability of the home. No one may, without lawful
''
grounds, enter a home against the will of those residing in it. 26
Although it says that, everybody knows that the Soviet Constitution is a cynical document. When the K.G.B. breaks into the home of a
Soviet dissident and steals his or her papers, the judge, instead of
reproaching the police and returning the documents to their owner,
conspires with the police to use the documents against the dissident.
Comparing article 55 to the fourth amendment, it can be said, confuses
the shams of a police state with a charter for liberty.

25. E. HYDE, EARL OF CLARENDON,
WARS IN ENGLAND 296 (Oxford 1826).
26.

7
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Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in 15
29 (Blaustein & Flanz ed. 1978).
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